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a Chance,
Come Whence
They May

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No. 24

TRUSTEES OF THE SCHOLARSHIP FUND
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Last Notice

The Annual Meeting of The Latin Club

Send Your Postal Card at Once

The third meeting and the first regular annual meeting of The New York Latin Club is called for Saturday, May 4, at 12 M., in the Hotel Albert, corner of University Place and Eleventh Street, New York. Professor Charles E. Bennett of Cornell University will address the Club on the subject: "A Roman Waring [Geo. E. Jr.] and his Legacy". Officers for the ensuing year will also be elected at this meeting. The plan is to serve luncheon (50 cents a plate) at 12 M. promptly. The address will follow, and adjournment will occur about 2 P. M. Please send postal card *at once* to the Secretary, Mr. A. L. Hodges, 36 East Twelfth Street, New York, if you intend to be present.

As the final issue of THE LEAFLET for this year (No. 25) may not appear until after this meeting, further notice of the meeting need not be expected.

H. F. TOWLE, *Acting President*
A. L. HODGES, *Acting Secretary*

The Qui-Clause after Dignus, etc., Once More

In the Syllabus of Subjunctive Constructions which my students at Cornell used, and of which I left a copy, with verbal explanations, in the hands of my successor, the qui-clause with *dignus*, etc. was placed under the head of the Volitive Subjunctive, with the title "Clause of the Direction of a Fitness". The same classification, and substantially the same title ("Clause of the Direction of an Aptitude"), were adopted when I put the Syllabus into print for my students in the University of Chicago, adding a treatment of the Indicative*.

The Syllabus, which was necessarily a bare skeleton of the treatment of the Latin Moods and Tenses which I had worked out, contained no explanations further than those suggested by the mere placing of the various constructions. But the reason which I gave to my classes for not putting the construction under the head of Result (as had been done, up to that time, by most of those who had expressed an opinion) was in point of fact identical with that which Professor Bennett has recently given in LATIN LEAFLET, No. 20, namely that the clause does not indicate result (I use the word here in its ordinary sense), since what it expresses is never a fact.

I do not, however, myself think, nor did my classification imply, that the *dignus qui* clause had originated in a clause of Purpose. Indeed, the fact that

Mr. Bennett, in his search for an origin, looks for it in so specialized a clause as that of Purpose, seems to me to proceed from too narrow a conception of method; and the same may be said of his selection of examples. Undoubtedly various new constructions have grown out of special types of usage under a more general kind; but nevertheless there is, in the long run, a better hope of success if one who is seeking for the origin of a given construction looks first to comparatively primitive forces rather than to specialized ones,—to the simple volitive force of the Subjunctive, for example, rather than to the special application of it called the clause of Purpose. Again, Mr. Bennett seems to me wrong in starting,—if it is possible to do otherwise,—from types of *examples* which are, to say the least, unusual, instead of starting from ordinary types. Indeed, owing to his habit of generally *not* giving citations, alike in the Grammar and the Appendix, one never knows whether to rely on a given example as actual Latin, or whether to suppose it to have been devised by the writer himself,—in which case we cannot, of course, so completely pin our faith to it. Thus Mr. Bennett's example (Appendix § 368 5) "*dat mihi surculos dignos quos seram*", he gives me shoots fit to plant" ("from which", he says, "it seems impossible to separate a sentence like *dat mihi surculos quos seram*, he gives me shoots to plant") may, or may not, be actual Latin. No man has every sentence of Latin literature in his memory, and this may be a real quotation; but I do not recall it, and I strongly suspect that, though it is presented to us as a sure point of departure from which the clause of Purpose cannot be separated, it was written by Mr. Bennett himself to illustrate his theory, being modeled upon a passage in the *De Or.*, 2 69 278: *amabo te, inquit, da mihi ex ista arbore quos seram surculos*. Similarly I suspect that Mr. Bennett's "*homines dignos elegit quos mitteret*", he selected fit men, (in order) to send them" is of his own writing. Cicero, who has a great many examples of the *dignus qui* clause, certainly does not, in the Orations or the Philosophical Works (for which alone we have as yet complete lexicons), present any example with a word like *mitto* or *dat*. His words or phrases all express or imply *existence* (e. g. *est, videtur, esse puto, habeo, I possess*, i. e. *something that I possess is * * **). Now *do* and *mitto* beautifully suggest Purpose; but *est* and *esse videtur* are much less friendly to such a suggestion. While, then, Mr. Bennett's examples, and his genesis of the construction, are perfectly possible, I believe that a more probable genesis can be found.

My own method of procedure, in trying to find a starting-point for the construction, was as follows: I first asked myself: Is there any hint to be gained by comparative* study? To this the answer was

* This Syllabus was privately printed; but, by a mistake which I shall not now correct, it has recently been offered for sale by the University of Chicago Press.

† The vicissitudes of life, and especially my five years service of the American School of Classical Studies in Rome, have brought it about that I have only now reached the point at which it has become possible to put out my system in a single presentation; though I have meanwhile had the satisfaction of seeing more or less of it pass into general circulation through the writings of others.

* The importance of this general method in dealing with questions of Syntax (though fruitless in this particular case) is impossible to overestimate. To a certain limited extent it has been followed, in the treatment of the cases, by a number of makers of grammars. Yet nearly all workers in the Syntax of the Latin Verb (the same is true to a large extent of workers in the Syntax of the Greek Verb) confine their thoughts to the particular language which they are studying. Thus Mr. Bennett in his Grammar (1895), § 296 2 puts the Subjunctive clause after verbs of fearing under the head of Substantive

"no"; for no other language has a similar *expression* for the corresponding idea. The next question was, "Will the Volitive idea supply a natural and easy starting-point?" It seemed to me that it did. Thus an assumed paratactic combination, "the affair is a deserving one: put your best energies into it" (*digna res est: ibi tu nervos intendas*), could easily give rise to the actual common construction, as seen in the *digna res est ubi tu nervos intendas tuos* of Ter. *Eun.* 312, "the affair deserves that you should put your best energies into it". Would the Anticipatory idea supply a natural and easy starting-point,—let us say in a combination "the affair is a deserving one: I foresee that you will", etc.? Hardly; for this at any rate would apply less well in the many common cases where the speaker is *urging* something which, *per se*, is not regarded as likely to come about. Still more surely, the Potential idea ("you may possibly put your best energies upon it") and that of Ideal Certainty ("you would surely", etc.) failed to yield a starting-point. I therefore in my Syllabus placed the construction under the head of the Volitive.

But, though I was approaching the right track, I was not yet quite upon it. Mr Bennett, in the Appendix and in THE LEAFLET, speaks of other constructions with *dignus* (the poetical Infinitive and the Gerund with *ad*) as throwing light upon the function of the construction. His collection of examples (like my own at the time at which I prepared the Syllabus) lacks certain very interesting ones in which *dignus* is followed, not by *qui*, but by *cur* or *quare*. Now these words convey a strong hint; for they are extremely common in a group of constructions, independent or dependent, in which the feeling of *Obligation* or *Propriety* is recognizable. I ought, indeed, even without this hint, to have asked myself the question "Would the Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety yield an easy and natural starting-point for the *dignus qui* construction?" for in my Syllabus I had recognized the importance of this power of the Subjunctive*, though I had not made it one of

the main categories. If I had raised the question, the answer would have been "yes", though I should as yet have had no hint as to which of the two reasonable origins was the more probable. With the light thrown by *cur* and *quare*, I should now say that the origin in all probability lies in the Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety, or that, at any rate, if the construction began as a Volitive, it passed over, in *feeling*, to the other class.

The view now set forth will best commend itself if the construction we are examining is exhibited with its relatives grouped about it as follows:

Subjunctive Statement of Obligation or Propriety: quid facere debuisti? frumentum ne emisses, "what ought you to have done? You ought not to have bought the grain", Cic. *Verr.* 3 84 195; "*non redderes*", "you ought not (to have paid in the money)", Plaut. *Trin.* 133; *non eo sis consilio*, "you should not adopt this opinion", Cic. *Fam.* 9 16 7; *a legibus non recedamus*, "we should not swerve from the law", Cic. *Clu.* 57 155.

Question of Obligation or Propriety: quid ego te inviteam, "why should I urge you?" Cic. *Cat.* 1 9 24 (Direct Question); *non video cur non audeam*, "I don't see why I should not venture", Cic. *Sen.* 21 77 (Indirect Question).

Clause of Obligation or Propriety, with a Relative or ut: nihil est, quod pocula laudes, "there is no reason why you should praise the cups" (nothing with reference to which you should), Verg. *Ecl.* 3 48; *satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum animadverteret*, "he thought there was reason enough why he should punish him", Caes. *B. G.* 1 19 1; *non iusta causa est, ut vos servem sedulo*? "isn't there good reason that I should guard you carefully?" Plaut. *Capt.* 257; *nulla studia tanti ut amicitiae officium deseratur*, "no studies (are) so important that what is due to friendship should be abandoned", Plin. *Ep.* 8 9 2.

Clause of the Direction of a Fitness: erit dignior locus ullus qui hanc virtutem excipiat? "will there be any place more worthy to harbor such virtue?" (any worthier that it should harbor . . .), Cic. *Mil.* 37 101; *nihil enim dignum faciebat, quare eius fugae comitem me adiungerem*, "for he was doing nothing worthy to make me add myself as an associate in his flight" (no worthy thing, on account of which I should . . .), Cic. *Att.* 9 10 2; *tamen digna causa videretur cur inimicitias susceperem*, "still the cause would seem to deserve that I should incur enmities for it" (would seem a worthy cause, for which I ought . . .), Cic. *Verr.* 2 47 117.

An interesting sporadic construction of the same nature may be seen in Plaut. *Trin.* 288: *quod manu*

Neglected Use of the Latin Subjunctive"; but its main view was one that I had already been teaching, and some of the typical examples, as it happens, are likewise to be found in the note-books of my students in Chicago.

The dependent Relative Clauses, so far as they had up to that time been treated, had generally been called Indirect Questions. My treatment, I think, first put them under the head of Dependent Clauses of Obligation or Propriety, my reason being that words and phrases like *nihil* and *non est* could not imply a question, nor words like *quod* ask one. This construction was discussed by Mr Elmer in the *American Journal of Philology* (see above), and the view which I taught at Cornell (namely that the construction was of Volitive origin) was controverted, though without mention of my name.

The Volitive could in point of fact easily give rise to such a force, when colored by introductory words like *cur* (just as *why shall?* easily suggests *why should?*), and, indeed, in the declarative forms as well, as in *ne difficilia optemus*, Cic. *Verr.* 4 7 15 and *vel tu ne faceres tale in adolescentia*, Plaut. *Pseud.* 434,—a Volitive or "jussive" of the past. But I now regard the construction as due to the coming-together (Fusion) in Latin of two Moods, indistinguishable (in Latin) in form, namely the Volitive Subjunctive (as above) and the Optative as expressing Obligation, etc. The discussion of this subject (including the question of the *origin* of the power named for the Optative) belongs to the things which the service of another cause has thus far crowded out.

Clauses Developed from the Optative, and, even in his most recent writing (in *The Teaching of Latin and Greek in the Secondary School*, C E Bennett and G P Bristol, Longmans, Green & Co., 1901) says, on p 137, "the explanation of this apparent anomaly is easily furnished in the fact that the Latin forms of expressions have developed from subjunctives of wish: *ne veniat* and *ut veniat*. These expressions originally meant respectively 'may he not come', 'may he only (ut) come'". How can Mr Bennett so completely leave Greek out of sight, in which the construction is not Optative, but Subjunctive? It is true that there is no absolute certainty that two apparently parallel constructions in two related languages are really parallel in origin. But the chances are that they are, and, unless evidence can be found to the contrary, there is nothing to do but to classify them accordingly. His Appendix would have given Mr Bennett an opportunity to say why he rejected for the Latin clause of Fear the apparently easy solution proposed long ago by Delbrück for the Greek clause ("he must not do so and so: I am afraid", in which the Subjunctive is Volitive, and, with the help of the negative, expresses aversion). As he has not done so (and this is by no means the sole case of the kind), I am inclined to believe that, when he is considering problems of Latin Syntax, he, so to speak, locks himself in with his Latin books, and speculates about Latin as a solitary and relationless language.

* It might be felt, if no explanation were given, that I ought not to speak of sentences of Obligation or Propriety without crediting the name, and one of the categories mentioned below, to Professor Elmer of Cornell, who has in several places (e.g. *Am J Ph* XV 1894, and *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology* VI 1898) made use of the same term and the same explanations. But in point of fact this exact phrase was (so far as I am aware) first used by myself, in my early teaching at Cornell (sometimes in the longer form "Subjunctive of Obligation, Propriety, or Reasonableness"), and was upon my Cornell Syllabus as well as the Chicago Syllabus. This power, under the name of the "Prescriptive", had been recognized by various workers (e.g. Delbrück and Whitney) as one of the powers of the Sanskrit Optative; but, though an occasional translation by "should" showed that it must have been at least unconsciously felt by one and another in various Latin sentences, the distinct power had not before, I think, been recognized for this language. I had the pleasure, as associate editor of the *Classical Review*, of sending in a paper by Mr Elmer (*Cl R* XII 1898 p 199) on "A

non queunt tangere, tantum fas habent quo manus abstineant, "what they can't lay hand on, that alone they think a proper thing to keep their hands off from" (a thing sacred, from which they *should*, etc.). The feeling of *fas quo* is essentially the same as that of *dignus quo*.

The *ut*-clause after *dignus* (which appears in extant Latin as early as the *qui*-clause) is equally simple. *Dignus qui* means originally "a worthy person, who . . .", while *dignus ut* means originally "a worthy person, in connection with which worthiness . . .".

In another paper, I hope to continue the discussion begun in THE LEAFLET (apropos of the *dignus qui* construction) with regard to "Clauses of Characteristic" and "Characterizing Clauses", and to include a word upon the point at issue between Mr Bennett and Mr Holmes.

W G HALE

The University of Chicago

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